

# Mac OS X Client Lab Security

Part 1

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## What Is Lab Security?

#### **Controlling usage**


- Why
  - Preserve privacy
  - Stop malicious behavior
- How
  - Permissions
  - Automated monitoring

# **Physical Security**

#### Lock the CPU

- Use thick cables or chains
- Use special locks or screws for iMacs





# **Physical Security**

#### **Lab Environment**

- Cameras
- Alarms
- Attentive staff
- Card reader





# **Physical Security**

#### **Monitor tampering**

- Network monitoring
  - InterMapper
  - Nagios


#### **Automated system profiling**

- Apple Remote Desktop
- InterMapper
- "system\_profiler"

# What is boot security?

- Bypass ALL security: boot to a different hard disk
- Mac OS X offers many ways to do this









#### **Open Firmware**

- What is it?
- Set it
  - Apple's tool
  - OFPW tool
- Verify
  - Is it set?
  - Is it correct?





#### **Older hardware**

- Single user mode
  - SecureIt



- Drives
  - Unplug CD, ZIP, Floppy drives
  - Do not install Classic
  - Use only one hard disk partition
  - Beware external drives (SCSI, etc)

#### Mac OS 9/Classic

- DO NOT dual boot
- Lock Startup Disk prefs
- Use shadow disk image



ShadowClassic

# Regular Hard Disk Cleanup

#### File by file cleanup

- Radmind
- RsyncX

#### **Imaging**

Apple Software Restore

#### **Tripwires**

- Radmind
- CheckMate
- Tripwire



## **Published Exploits**

#### **Push out updates ASAP**

- Radmind
- RsyncX
- ASR



#### Stay informed by staying involved

- Apple's security list
- Many other lists
  - Small lists are often the 1st to know

# **Admin System Changes**

#### **Code** wisely

- Every modification a potential hole
- Use full paths
- Use trusted system calls/tools

#### **Permissions**

Check, check, check

# **Admin System Changes**

#### **Remove access**

- Remove world read permissions
  - Cron
  - Startup Items
  - LoginHook and LogoutHook
- Set allow list for cron execution
- Do not enable root user

#### **World Writable**

#### Protect non-user file space

- Setup image carefully!
  - Track OS & software installs
    - Radmind or File Buddy
  - Remove world write permissions
    - Not Caches, ColorSync Profiles, User space, /.Trashes, /Volumes, /cores, /dev, /tmp, /var/run, and /var/tmp

#### **World Writable**

#### Use links/aliases/disk images for:

- Final Cut Pro
- Omnipage Pro
- Painter
- Now Up To Date
- Virtual PC
- FreeHand
- Classic QuarkXPress 4.11





#### **World Writable**

#### Find world writable

- WhoOwnsWhat
- "sudo find / -perm -2"


#### **Check writable at startup**

Automate "find <path> -perm 2"

# After Logout - "nohup"

#### What is it?

- No hangup
  - nohup <command>
- Does not quit at logout



# After Logout - "nohup"

#### How to kill nohup processes

- LogoutHook
  - "killall -u \$1"
    - Not very clean
  - killsumapps.pl
    - Kill all non-system user processes
  - And kill SUID

# Q&A



# Mac OS X Client Lab Security

Part 2

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#### Safe password practices

- Use strong passwords
  - 8 characters minimum
  - Upper/lower case, numbers, symbols
  - No known word(s)
  - Phrase reduction
    - "I am me, sky by be!" 1@m,sbB!
  - Use a password generator

#### Crack your own password

- John the Ripper
- See how long it takes

### Change passwords often

6 months probably good



#### Fix NetInfo world read permissions

- NetInfo Manager
- nicl, nidump, nifind, nigrep, niload, nireport, niutil



- /var/db/netinfo/local.nidb/
- /var/backups/local.nidump

#### Use unique local passwords

#### Don't use local users and passwords

- Password Server
- Kerberos
- LDAPv3 & SSL
- Enterprise Directory
  - Novell
  - Active Directory





#### What is SUID root?

- Set-UID
- Running a tool as the tool's owner ID
- Joe runs non-SUID root tool (common)
  - Tool runs as Joe
- Joe runs SUID root tool (less common)
  - Tool runs as root

#### **Secure SUID root tools**

- Find them
  - "sudo find / -perm -4000 -user 0"
- Remove world execute permissions
- Do not add untrusted SUID root tools

#### "Useless" SUID root tools

- /bin/rcp
- /sbin/rdump
- /sbin/rrestore
- /usr/bin/rlogin
- /usr/bin/rsh
- More...

#### **Useful SUID root tools**

- /usr/sbin/netstat
- /sbin/ping
- /usr/sbin/traceroute
- /usr/bin/crontab
- More...

#### **SUID** root applications

- Disk Utility
- NetInfo Manager
- Classic: TruBlueEnvironment
- Finder.app: OwnerGroupTool
- System Prefs: readconfig, writeconfig
- Several printer utilities
- More...











#### 3rd party applications

- Radmind Assistant
- Retrospect Client
- Virtual PC







# **Network Sniffing**

#### Minimize threat of sniffing

- Use a smart switch or router
  - Lock ports to ethernet addresses
- Use secure applications
  - ssh, not telnet
  - sftp, not ftp
  - ssl email transfer

#### **Services**

#### Running server processes

- Only enable what is needed
- Configure access lists
- Enable firewall
  - Poke holes for legitimate ports

#### What if you are still compromised?

- Psychopath graduate cs students
- Forgetfulness
- Sneaky students
- Incompotent coworker

#### Configure ALL access lists, even if off

- Firewall
- sudoers
  - Replace "%admin" with <username>
- sshd
  - Add "AllowUser <username>"
  - Replace "Protocol 2,1" with "Protocol 2"

- TCP-Wrappers
  - /etc/hosts.allow
  - /etc/hosts.deny
  - inetd
  - xinetd
  - sshd
- httpd

#### **Security scanners**

- Nmap
  - Shows open ports
- Nessus
  - Scans open ports for vulnerabilities





#### Logs

- Use a central logger
  - syslogd
- Use a log checker
- Enable extra logging where possible
  - xinetd
  - Process accounting

#### **Intrusion Detection**

#### **Types**

- Honey Pot
  - Keep up to date!
- On router or switch
  - Privacy violation imminent
    - Contact Lawyers
- Snort
  - HenWen





## **Mac OS X Lab Security**

#### More details available

- http://www.macos.utah.edu/ macosx\_security.html
- Scripts
- Links

# Q&A